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SETTING BOUNDARIES FOR STUDENT DUE PROCESS: RUSTAD
V. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AND THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN DISCIPLINARY DISMISSAL
PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
"Due process " is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefi-
nable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. I
Chief Justice Warren's short, amorphous and prophetic characteri-
zation of procedural due process 2 has been echoed many times during
the last twenty-five years by the Supreme Court in its interpretations of
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 3 Dur-
ing this period, judicial examination of the "elusive concept" of proce-
dural due process has occurred in a wide variety of contexts.4 A
significant amount of this recent due process litigation has emerged
from classrooms, schoolhouses and campuses. Initially, courts were re-
luctant to find that students had constitutional rights in an educational
setting.5 Since the federal courts have recognized the right to due pro-
cess in this context, 6 however, there have been numerous attempts to
define the exact parameters of student due process. Courts have devel-
oped different minimum due process requirements for various types of
student-school conflicts.
Currently, the least settled area of student due process law occurs in
the context of educational disciplinary actions involving dismissal.
1. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
2. Procedural due process rights, as opposed to substantive due process rights, exist
only when a government takes action which involves a specific individual. Substantive due
process rights, in contrast, exist when a government takes actions which affect a group of
people. SeeJ. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, B.J. YOUNG, CONSTITrIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1983).
3. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("[D]ue process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."); Cafeteria
and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (" '[Diue process,'
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances.") (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Due process is not a mechanical in-
strument. It is not a yardstick. . . . It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably
involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the
unfolding of the process.").
4. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1973) (prejudgment replevin of goods purchased
on an installment plan); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (evicting a tenant); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspending a driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (terminating public welfare assistance); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969) (garnishing wages before judgment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1969) (removing
delinquent children from their parent's home).
5. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
6. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
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There is general agreement that notice and a hearing are mandatory
before a pupil may be permanently expelled;7 but there is considerable
controversy with regard to the procedural rights which must be granted
at dismissal hearings. In particular, the lower federal courts are divided
on the issue of the student's right to legal representation.
8
The following discussion reviews the general development of pro-
cedural due process. It then highlights some recent federal court deci-
sions addressing educational due process and the split of authority in
these decisions on the right to counsel in student dismissal actions. The
article then analyzes the recent Tenth Circuit opinion in Rustad v. United
States Air Force,9 suggests an analytical framework for future student due
process cases, and concludes that Rustad will be interpreted as a case
that sets an outer boundary for procedural due process in an educa-
tional context.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is derived from the fifth' 0 and fourteenth"
amendments, which only provide protection to individuals faced with
governmental actions that may deprive them of life, liberty or prop-
erty. 12 The threshold question facing courts in procedural due process
cases is whether the private interest affected by government action can
be considered a liberty or property interest. The Supreme Court's defi-
nition of liberty and property interests protected by the due process
clause has undergone an interesting metamorphosis. Sixty years ago the
Court took an expansive view of the concepts of liberty and property; its
broad characterization, though, did not include public sector benefits. 13
In 1970 the Supreme Court extended its definition of protected liberty
and property interests to include government benefits.1 4 From this ini-
tial recognition that certain government "entitlements" could not be
7. Id. See also infra notes 31-36.
8. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
9. 718 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1983).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § I provides, in part: "No person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states, in part: "[Nior shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
12. See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property ". Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 452 (1977).
13. For example, in attempting to describe the liberty interest, the Court in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), stated:
[L]iberty. . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
14. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (the Court held that welfare benefits
were "not mere charity, but a 'means to promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity' ").
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taken away from an individual without minimal procedural safeguards,15
the Court has, since 1972, more narrowly defined the types of public
benefits which are liberty or property interests protected by the due pro-
cess clauses. 16
Once it has been determined that a specific private interest is a lib-
erty or property interest, within the meaning of the due process clause,
judicial due process analysis must address a second question: whether
minimal procedural safeguards were followed before deprivation of the
private interest. The Supreme Court's articulation of the procedures re-
quired by due process when government implicates a protected private
interest has also gone through periods of expansion and retraction.
Early cases established notice and hearing as the minimally required
procedural safeguards. 17 In the early 1970's it appeared that full evi-
dentiary hearings might be mandated. 18 The Court rapidly retreated
from this stance 1 9 in favor of a balancing of private-versus-governmen-
tal interests approach as articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 0 In the last
decade the Court has consistently applied the Mathews three-pronged
balancing test 2' which maximizes judicial discretion. 22 Moreover, appli-
cation of the Mathews test triggers different levels of due process
protection.
23
B. Procedural Due Process on Campus
1. The Dawn of Student Due Process
For a long time, the administrative processes of educational institu-
tions, insofar as they concerned students, were not subjected to close
15. See Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531 (1975) (a
review of procedural due process litigation in the early 1970's).
16. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (a city police officer's interest in contin-
ued public employment is not a protected liberty or property interest unless state law has
granted some form of guarantee of permanent employment); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974) (nonprobationary federal employee's statutorily created property interest in
not being discharged except "for cause," did not require procedural protections beyond
those afforded by statute); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (non-tenured
professor's interest in re-employment is not a protected property or liberty interest). But
see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (non-tenured college professor's property
interest in re-employment protected by the due process clause because professor had ten-
ure under college's de facto tenure program).
17. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Grannis v. Or-
dean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
18. See Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. at 264.
19. Rendleman, supra note 15.
20. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
21. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas & Water v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).
22. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-335. The court indicated the following fac-
tors should be considered in determining the "specific dictates" of due process: 1) the
private interest affected by the official action; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and 3) the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens which the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
23. See supra note 21 and cases cited therein.
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judicial scrutiny.2 4 Historically, courts had deferred to academic and dis-
ciplinary decisions made by school officials. 2 5 Both courts and school
officials advanced a wide variety of theories to justify judicial abstention
in this area of the law. The justifications included: (1) the doctrine of in
loco parentis, which suggested that schools derived authority to discipline
students by assuming the role of a surrogate parent; (2) contract theory,
under which a student's receipt of an education was conditioned on stu-
dent obedience to school regulations; and (3) the view that attendance
at a public educational institution was a privilege rather than a right.
2 6
In 1961, the Fifth Circuit broke sharply with this tradition ofjudicial
abstention by establishing due process requirements for student disci-
plinary hearings. In the landmark decision of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education 27 students at a state college who had participated in
demonstrations were expelled without notice or a hearing. The Dixon
court held that, even if attendance at a state-supported school was a
privilege rather than a right, "the state could not condition the granting
of a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to due
process." 2 8 According to the Fifth Circuit, minimum requirements of
procedural due process would be dependent on the particular circum-
stances and interests of the parties involved.2 9 In short, the Dixon court
determined that due process required notice and a hearing which con-
tained the rudiments of an adversary proceeding.
30
Although Dixon radically departed from precedent, other lower fed-
eral courts quickly required that procedural due process be afforded stu-
dents faced with disciplinary dismissal from government supported
educational institutions.3 ' These courts, however, diverged on the
question of whether the due process clause applied to temporary sus-
pensions from school.3 2 The Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez33 provided
24. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Knapp, Due Process as a Management Tool in Schools and Prisons, 28
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 379 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Counsel in Disciplinary Proceedings in Public and Private
Educational Institutions, 9 CuM. L. REV. 751, 758 (1979).
26. See 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 126, 126-27 (1979).
27. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
28. Id. at 156.
29. Id. at 155.
30. Specifically, the Dixon court required that the notice contain a statement of specific
charges and grounds for expulsion. The procedures mandated for the hearing included
the requirement that the student be told the names of the school's witnesses and the facts
to which these witnesses testified. Furthermore, the court held that the student was to be
permitted to testify on his own behalf and to produce his own witnesses or written affida-
vits at the hearing. Additionally, the student was to have the right to inspect the written
results and findings of the hearing. Id. at 158-59.
Significantly, however, the Dixon court rejected the idea that due process in this case
mandated a "full-dress judicial hearing" with the right to cross-examine witnesses, and
reasoned that this type of hearing might be impractical and detrimental to the school's
educational atmosphere. Id. at 159.
31. See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Wasson
v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. For decisions in which the due process clause was found applicable to removals
from school short of expulsion, see for example: Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist.,
475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Tate v. Board of Educ.,
[Vol. 62:1
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the answer to this question by requiring notice and opportunity to be
heard in student suspensions of ten days or less. At the same time, the
Court rejected the idea that attendance at a state-supported school was a
privilege and concluded that students had liberty and property interests
in their education.3 4 Although notice and a hearing were minimally re-
quired for short-term suspensions, the Goss majority stated that further
procedural protections, such as the right to counsel, and the right to
confront, cross-examine, and call witnesses would be left to the discre-
tion of school officials. 3 5 Observing that longer suspensions or expul-
sions might require more formal procedures, the Court declined to
outline appropriate due process requirements for these situations.
3 6
2. Student Due Process and the Right to Counsel
In the wake of Dixon and Goss, and during a period of widespread
student unrest, the federal judiciary attempted to determine the nature
and extent of procedural due process in various academic contexts. A
considerable amount of student due process litigation has focused on
the right to counsel. The right to counsel controversy has arisen in di-
verse educational settings, including state supported high schools, col-
leges and universities, and federal military service academies. 3 7 There is
not widespread acceptance of the view that students have an absolute
right to counsel in educational proceedings, nor is there widespread ac-
ceptance of the view that students have no right whatsoever to counsel
in these proceedings. Instead, the trend of the decisions has been to
establish procedural guidelines for specific fact patterns. It has become
clear that due process hearings will not usually be required at private
schools3 8 or in academic dismissals;3 9 thus, the right to counsel is not an
453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972). In several cases, however, lower federal courts found tem-
porary suspensions not within the scope of the due process clause. See, e.g., Black Coali-
tion v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973); Murray v. West Baton
Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973); Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463
F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
33. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
34. Id. at 572-74.
35. Id. at 583-84.
36. Id. at 584.
37. The due process clause has been found to be applicable both to cadets and mid-
shipmen facing separation at military service academies as well as to students facing dis-
missal at state supported educational institutions. Love v. Hidalgo, 508 F. Supp. 177, 181
(D. Md. 1981); see Andrews v. Knowlton, 509 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
873 (1975); Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge,
382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Johnson, Due Process Requirements in the Suspension or
Dismissal of Students from Public Educational Institutions, 5 CAP. U.L. REV. 1 (1976).
However, courts have recognized that in the process of balancing private versus gov-
ernmental interests in student due process cases, the government's interest will be greater
in military service academy cases than in cases involving students at other tax-supported
institutions. Courts have reasoned that this stronger government interest in military ser-
vice academy dismissals is based on the necessity for prompt action in the conduct of
military operations and the desirability of instilling and maintaining discipline and morale
in cadets who will be required to bear weighty responsibilities in combat situations. Hago-
pian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807,
812 (2d Cir. 1967).
38. See Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (private school actions
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
issue in these settings. Similarly, in short-term suspension proceedings
a student has no right to legal representation.
40
The right to counsel seems to be most clearly afforded support in
educational dismissal actions based on criminal charges which are the
subject of a pending criminal action.4 1 In this situation, the dangers of
self-incrimination and the student's "awareness of his own inability to
evaluate the effect" of his statements on the pending criminal proceed-
ings justify the presence of an attorney.
4 2
The students' right to legal representation in disciplinary dismissal
hearings has received divisive treatment in the lower federal courts.
Generally, due process violations are not found where schools have per-
mitted students to be represented by an attorney.43 Conversely, where
legal counsel is denied, many courts rule that such a denial is not viola-
tive of due process. 4 4 The reasons these courts have advanced for deny-
ing legal representation at disciplinary hearings include: (1) the student
can defend himself sufficiently; (2) counsel would create overly adver-
sarial school proceedings; (3) the school will not use counsel; and (4) the
Dixon requirements of notice and hearing are adequate.
4 5
In contrast to the arguments against legal representation, the courts
that recognize the right to counsel in disciplinary dismissals justify their
position in several ways: (1) the risk of dismissal is a serious deprivation
are not state action); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), remanded, 412 F.2d 1128
(D.C. Cir. 1969); see also Wilkinson and Rolapp, The Private College and Student Discipline, 56
A.B.A.J. 121 (1970).
39. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); see also Henderson & Isenberg,
The Law and Academic Evaluation and Dismissal in Higher Education, 13 CuM. L. REv. 475
(1983); Note, Charlotte's Web: Reflections on the Role of Due Process in Academic Decisionmaking,
56 IND. L.J. 725 (1981). However, if the academic suspension or expulsion stems from
disciplinary charges, some courts have interpreted the due process clause to require that
the student be afforded a hearing. See Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147
(M.D. Pa. 1978); Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (failure to submit
requisite documentation and failure to attend class regularly).
40. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583 stated: "We stop short of construing the Due
Process Clause to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspen-
sions must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel .... "
41. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978); cf. Nzuve v. Castleton State
College, 133 Vt. 225, 335 A.2d 321 (1975) (school permits student facing pending crimi-
nal charges to have attorney at disciplinary proceedings).
42. Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 104.
43. See, e.g., Wimmer v. Lehman, 705 F.2d 1402 (4th Cir. 1983); Cody v. Scott, 565 F.
Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710 (D. Colo. 1975);
Center for Participant Educ. v. Marshall, 337 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Fla. 1972); Kelly v. Mar-
tin, 16 Ariz. App. 7, 490 P.2d 836 (1971).
44. As one commentator noted, schools which allow legal representation at discipli-
nary proceedings do so more "as a matter of grace than compulsion." Wright, The Consti-
tution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1075 (1969). For decisions which do not
recognize legal representation in disciplinary proceedings as a minimum requirement of
due process, see Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1028 (1968); Kolesa v. Lehman, 534 F. Supp. 590 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Garshman v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.
Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968), at'Jd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905
(1969); Due v. Florida A&M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).




which mandates additional procedural safeguards; (2) legal counsel will
help to protect student's interests at the disciplinary proceedings; and
(3) the intrusions on the school by permitting the student to have coun-
sel present would be minimal. 46 But even in the disciplinary cases
where legal representation is considered a minimal procedural due pro-
cess requirement there are differing views as to whether the proper role
of counsel should be adversarial or advisory.
4 7
It is against this unsettled background of due process in student
disciplinary dismissal proceedings that the Tenth Circuit examined the
right to counsel in Rustad v. United States Air Force.
4 8
II. RUSTAD V. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
A. Facts
On February 12, 1982, Kevin M. Rustad, a First Class Senior Cadet
at the United States Air Force Academy, was charged with several con-
duct violations. 49 Some of the alleged conduct violations involved in-
fraction of cadet rules;50 two of the charges were criminal in nature.
5 1
Rustad was notified by letter that an administrative hearing would be
convened to determine if he should be disenrolled from the Academy.
Pursuant to Air Force regulations, 5 2 Rustad elected to present his case
to a hearing officer and to seek the advice of retained counsel prior to
the hearing. 53 Rustad also requested, and was denied, the right to have
his attorney present at the proceedings against him.54 The report made
by the Hearing Officer 55 and sent to the Academy Board concluded that,
although Rustad was not guilty of the two criminal charges, he had vio-
lated several Academy rules and regulations. 56 Rustad asked that his
retained counsel be allowed to appear with him on April 28, 1982, when
46. French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969). See also, Manin v.
University of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974).
47. Some courts have suggested that the attorney be allowed to speak at the hearing.
E.g., Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1257-58 (S.D. Miss. 1970), afd, 440 F.2d
1351 (5th Cir. 1971); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969).
Other decisions indicate counsel should be admitted in an advisory capacity only. E.g.,
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967), afd,
415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). See also Comment, The
Right to Counsel in Disciplinary Proceedings in Public and Private Educational Institutions, 9 CUM. L.
REV. 751, 753-54 (1979).
48. 718 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1983). An earlier Tenth Circuit case addressed the ques-
tion of whether due process was afforded to an Air Force Academy cadet during disenroll-
ment proceedings, but in that case, the right to counsel was not at issue since the student
was represented by counsel. Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710 (D. Colo. 1975).
49. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 349.
50. The alleged infractions included absence from his required duty, maintaining a
residence off the United States Air Force Academy and having an unauthorized guest in
his room. Id.
51. The criminal charges included larceny and use of marijuana. Id.
52. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 349 (citing Air Force Regulation 53-3, entitled "Disenrollment
of United States Air Force Cadets").
53. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 349.
54. Id.
55. The hearing officer in this case was an attorney. Id. at 351 (McKay,J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 349.
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the Academy Board would hear his case. This second request for coun-
sel was denied. 57 At the April 28 meeting the Board decided to dis-
enroll Rustad.
5 8
Rustad sought a preliminary injunction in federal district court to
enjoin enforcement of the Academy Board's order and to bar his dis-
enrollment. The district court denied this preliminary injunction. On
appeal, Rustad argued that since he was charged with felonious miscon-
duct, an "entirely different hue taint[s] the view of the fairness of the
hearings" afforded him. 59 Rustad further asserted that representation
by an attorney in disciplinary proceedings at the Air Force Academy was
a right established by twenty-six years of Air Force common law. 60 Re-
tained counsel, according to Rustad, was minimally required by the due
process clause. He also emphasized that the presence of counsel during
the hearing would not injure any government interest.
6'
The government, on appeal, contended that Rustad's claim for re-
lief was moot, since the time of his final examinations had passed.
62
Further, it argued that Rustad was afforded sufficient due process be-
cause he was permitted to have the assistance of an attorney prior to the
hearing.63 The government also suggested that military academies
could be "crippled by the ready availability of injunctive judicial relief"
if Rustad's request for counsel was granted. 64 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
denying injunctive relief, ruling that the due process clause did not give




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals viewed the Rustad case as rais-
ing a single constitutional issue for decision.6 6 Both the majority opin-
ion 67 and the dissent6 8 addressed the question of whether minimal
requirements of procedural due process under the fifth amendment
were met when Cadet Rustad was not permitted to have counsel present
57. Id.
58. Judge McKay, dissenting, suggested that the Board's written decision indicated
that the alleged criminal charges influenced the Board's decision to disenroll Rustad. Id.
at 350 (McKay, J., dissenting).
59. Brief for Appellant at 7, Rustad v. United States Air Force, 718 F.2d 348 (10th
Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 9. The district court characterized the practice of appointing counsel at
disciplinary hearings as a "tradition" rather than as a "right." Id.
61. Id. at 9, 12.
62. Brief for Appellees at 5.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id.
65. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 349.
66. The majority opinion notes that the appellees raised mootness as an issue which
would require dismissal; however, the court declined to dismiss on this ground, reasoning
that the court could fashion appropriate relief if Rustad won on the merits of the case. Id.
at 349-50.
67. Written by Circuit Judge McWilliams and joined by Circuit Judge Barrett.
68. Authored by Circuit Judge McKay.
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at the disenrollment proceedings. Although the Rustad court had a uni-
form perception of the problem presented by the case, the majority and
dissent split on their interpretation of the facts as well as on their choice
of applicable law.
1. Majority Opinion
In a surprisingly short opinion, Judge McWilliams, writing for the
majority, based the decision to deny counsel on two Second Circuit mili-
tary service academy disciplinary dismissal cases, Wasson v. Trowbridge
6 9
and Hagopian v. Knowlton. 70 These two decisions, not described in the
majority opinion, held that cadets facing expulsion were not entitled to
have an attorney present at proceedings against them; however, these
cases also implied that counsel might be required in hearings involving
criminal charges. 7 1 The court found no "present pertinency" 72 to the
argument that Rustad should be distinguished from Wasson and Hagopian,
remarking that the action against Rustad was "purely a disenrollment
proceeding from the start." 73 Military misdeeds, stated the court, and
not criminal acts, ultimately provided the basis for Rustad's
disenrollment.
74
The majority's minimization of the significance of the criminal
charges initiated against Rustad and its classification of the dismissal
proceeding as purely administrative is pivotal to its ruling. A different
interpretation of the facts, viewed in light of Wasson and Hagopian, sug-
gests that Rustad had a right to counsel. The court did not decide
whether legal representation would have been required at the meeting
of the Academy Board if Rustad had not been exonerated of the criminal
charges by the Hearing Officer.
2. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge McKay placed great weight on the fact that
Rustad had initially been charged with criminal conduct. 7 5 Judge Mc-
Kay argued that counsel should have been available at all stages of the
disenrollment proceedings to determine procedural mandates, to set
69. 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
70. 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972).
71. Regarding the right to counsel, the Second Circuit stated:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the
other aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature,
where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does
not proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and edu-
cated, where his knowledge of the events . . . should enable him to develop the
facts adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects of the
hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation by
counsel.
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d at 812, cited with approval in Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470
F.2d at 210.
72. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 350.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 351 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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testimonial constraints, and to avoid dangers of self-incrimination.
76
The dissent mentioned two facts, not discussed in the majority
opinion, to add credence to the view that the case presented extenuating
circumstances. The dissent pointed out, first, that appointed counsel
had been provided routinely for twenty-six years in similar proceed-
ings77 and, second, that the hearing officer was an attorney.
78
After citing Goss for the proposition that Rustad was entitled to due
process protection, the dissent applied the Mathews v. Eldrige79 three-
pronged balancing formula and determined that legal representation
was a minimal procedural requisite under the circumstances of this case.
In applying this three part test,80 the dissent found the following inter-
ests. First, Rustad had an interest in the benefits of four years of higher
education, the opportunity to receive a college degree, and his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. 8 1 Second, the government
interest was not greater than that of any other college or university be-
cause the Air Force was not required to commission Air Force Academy
graduates. 82 Judge McKay found "unlikely to the point of being fanci-
ful" the risk that the additional procedure of allowing retained counsel
would damage any government interest. 83 Third, the dissent stressed
that the additional procedural safeguard of student legal representation
would be valuable because of the seriousness of the charges brought
against Rustad.84 To support this application of the Mathews test the
dissent relied on two other federal circuit court decisions8 5 that recog-
nized the right to counsel in student expulsion proceedings under "no
more compelling circumstances" '8 6 than those presented in the instant
case.
III. PERSPECTIVES ON RUSTAD
A. Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
There is a hollow ring to the arguments voiced in the Rustad opin-
ion. The majority narrowly and superficially interpreted the facts and
applicable precedents, and the dissent erected a broad analytical frame-
work which proves shaky on close examination.
The majority's decision to deny counsel was based on the assump-
tion that the circumstances of the case were factually identical to those
presented in Wasson and Hagopian. The similarities were evident: all
76. Id. at 351-52.
77. Id. at 351.
78. Id.
79. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
80. See supra note 22 (lists the three Eldridge factors).




85. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978); Black Coalition v. Portland
School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973).
86. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 352 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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three cases focused on minimum due process requirements in the disci-
plinary dismissal of a cadet at a military service academy. Since the Was-
son and Hagopian courts had found that a fair hearing could be held
without counsel,8 7 the Rustad court reached the same conclusion. In so
doing, the court ignored important, potentially distinguishing circum-
stances: the criminal nature of the two charges initially filed against Rus-
tad8 8 and the fact that the service academy was represented by an
attorney in its initial hearing.
8 9
The court, furthermore, failed to analyze and correctly apply Wasson
and Hagopian. Both opinions emphasized the importance of the balanc-
ing of interests analysis and stressed that the circumstances of each case
should be carefully examined. 90 The majority opinion in Rustad did not,
however, articulate which private or governmental interests were at
stake nor did it fully analyze the facts; thus, the Rustad court ironically
ignored the dictates of the very cases it purported to follow.
The dissent, in contrast, examined the "big picture." In addition to
presenting important facts omitted in the majority opinion, Judge Mc-
Kay balanced the individual and governmental interests, as was sug-
gested by Wasson and Hagopian. The reasoning of the dissent faltered
though, when it compared the severity of the Rustad case with Gabrilowitz
v. Newman.9 1 Gabrilowitz presented more compelling circumstances than
Rustad. Gabrilowitz recognized the right to counsel in a student discipli-
nary dismissal proceeding when the student faced pending criminal
charges; Rustad, on the other hand, faced only possible criminal charges.
A more forceful argument could have been made by reasoning that
Gabrilowitz established a precedent "for the truly unusual situation."
9 2
The Rustad case should have been distinguished from Wasson and Hago-
pian as an unusual military service academy dismissal because (1) part of
the proceedings were conducted by an attorney; (2) the right to retain
87. See supra note 71.
88. The dismissal proceedings in Wasson and Hagopian, unlike the Rustad disenroll-
ment proceeding, were instituted solely because the cadets had accumulated an excessive
number of conduct demerits. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d at 203; Wasson v. Trow-
bridge, 382 F.2d at 811.
89. No similar qualifications of service academy disciplinarians were noted in either
Vasson or Hagopian.
90. The importance of this approach was initially enunciated by the Wasson court:
"Thus to determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the court
must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected and of the
government interest involved, taking account of history and the precise circumstances sur-
rounding the case at hand." Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d at 811. A similar view was
echoed in Hagopian:
[D]ue process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied undevi-
atingly to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which
depends upon the balancing of various factors ....
Because ... the factors controlling what process is due usually vary from
case to case, prior decisions on the subject cannot ordinarily furnish more than
general guidelines which might give the reader a "feel" for what is fundamentally
fair in a particular instance.
Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d at 207, 209.
91. 582 F.2d 100 (1978).
92. Id. at 106.
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counsel was denied when counsel had been routinely appointed for
many years; and (3) the dismissal was initially based on criminal charges.
Given this unusual situation, the Rustad court should have required the
additional procedural safeguard of retained counsel to assure a truly fair
hearing.
B. Implications of the Decision
The Rustad decision, if followed by other federal courts, may serve
to restrict the types of procedural safeguards granted to students facing
disciplinary dismissal at public educational institutions when there are
no related criminal charges pending against the student.
Critics of the right to counsel in disciplinary dismissals will be heart-
ened by this possible establishment of an outer boundary for procedural
due process. Such critics would argue that if Rustad had recognized a
right to'counsel, the doors would be open to claims to the right in al-
most all student disciplinary proceedings because conduct serious
enough to warrant disciplinary action is likely to involve at least a "col-
orable misdemeanor. ' 9 3 Furthermore, the critics would contend that
the benefits of passive assistance of counsel can be afforded by consulta-
tion between the student and attorney prior to and during breaks in dis-
ciplinary proceedings.
9 4
Those who disagree with the Rustad ruling may conclude that the
outer boundaries of procedural due process established by the case
seem suspiciously similar to minimally required due process protections
for student disciplinary dismissals. Goss definitely mandated notice and
hearing, but it appears that Rustad foreclosed the requirement of an ad-
versarial or even a semi-adversarial proceeding. Even if other rudiments
of an adversarial proceeding such as the right to confront, cross-ex-
amine and call witnesses are recognized as minimally required by the
due process clause, these rights may well be meaningless without the
assistance and advice of an attorney. 9 5
C. Suggestions for Future Judicial Examination of the Right to Counsel in
Disciplinary Dismissals
It is difficult to argue that the analysis of the majority opinion in
Rustad comports witl the traditional approach to procedural due pro-
cess controversies. The court's mechanical application of precedent and
its superficial examination of the factual context of the dispute makes a
troublesome departure from the traditional approach which balances
governmental and private interests on a case-by-case basis. Admittedly,
one can crinicize the balancing approach because it allows a significant
degree ol judicial discretion, making outcomes unpredictable and splits
of authority among jurisdictions more likely. However, these negative
93. 6;abrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 107 (CampbelIJ., dissenting).
!)-I hi. at 107-8.




effects of a flexible approach to student due process and the right to
counsel can be minimized in the future if the lower courts would give
specific consideration to a number of factors which affect the strength of
the student's or the educational institution's interest in a particular situ-
ation. Although additional factors may also be important in a specific
controversy, the following considerations should be evaluated by courts
in each student due process case that reviews the right to counsel in a
disciplinary dismissal.
On the private interest side, several factors should be scrutinized to
determine the weight of the individual's interest: the nature of the
charges brought against the student, the amount of time the student has
spent at the school and the benefits the student expects to attain by com-
pleting his education at the particular school. An analysis of these fac-
tors should aid the court in determining the weight of the private
interest at stake. An analogy can be made to criminal law where the
amount of procedure afforded the defendant increases as the potential
sanction grows more severe. Where the charge against the student not
only subjects him to possible expulsion but also exposes him to poten-
tial civil or criminal proceedings the student's interest in having the
assistance of an attorney is substantial. Thus, if criminal proceedings
are actually pending against the student for acts which are also the sub-
ject of the dismissal hearing, the individual's interest in protecting him-
self from self-incrimination becomes even greater. 9 6 The court should
also consider the severity of the charge and the possible punishment,
with allegations of criminal misconduct or conduct punishable by im-
prisonment being viewed as factors which substantially increase the indi-
vidual's interest in a due process right to legal representation.
The student's status at the school should also be reviewed by courts
when they balance the private interests against the governmental inter-
ests. An individual's interest in completing his education at a particular
institution is necessarily greater the further the student has advanced
toward graduation. This consideration is particularly important given
that a great number of disciplinary dismissal cases involve students in
their final year at school.
9 7
Since Goss, courts have recognized that all students have liberty and
property interests in their education. However, in certain situations the
student's interest in completing a program at a specific school will be
greater than the normal interest. In such situations the amount of pro-
cedural due process which is minimally required should increase. For
example, where the academic program or training offered at the school
is only available at a limited number of schools, the student will have an
interest in receiving the benefits of completing his education at his par-
ticular school. Thus, in cases involving dismissal from military service
academies or professional schools, which are quite limited in number,
96. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
97. E.g., Ruslad, 718 F.2d 348; Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d 100; Cody v. Scott, 565 F. Supp.
1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Me. 1970).
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courts should place the individual interest at a higher level and more
readily find a right to counsel. 9 8
In determining the strength of the government's interest in denying
the right to counsel, the following questions should be considered.
First, what is the scope of the requested participation of counsel? If
the student wishes to have counsel represent him in an adversarial
rather than advisory capacity, with the right to argue the case, make ob-
jections and cross examine witnesses, the school's interest in denying
counsel should be given greater weight. When counsel takes an active,
adversarial role, the proceeding is likely to be more burdensome on the
school in terms of time required for preparation and conduct of the
hearing than it would be if the attorney's services to the student were
strictly consultative.
9 9
Second, what is the nature of the school's representation at the dis-
ciplinary proceedings? It is obvious that the government's interest in
denying counsel will be less when it proceeds with the assistance of its
own legal counsel or if the hearings are conducted by attorneys ap-
pointed by the school, as in the Rustad case.100 Furthermore, it seems to
violate basic principles of fundamental fairness to allow one party legal
representation yet deny it to the other, especially when the party denied
counsel is the one facing the deprivation of a protected liberty or prop-
erty interest.
Third, is appointed counsel requested by the student? The govern-
ment's interest in refusing student legal representation will be less when
the school bears no cost in allowing the student the right to be repre-
sented by an attorney.
Fourth, what type of school wishes to deny the right to counsel? Is
it a military service academy or is it a civilian public educational institu-
tion? Courts have been inclined to weight the government's interest
more heavily if the school is a military service academy.' 0 '
While not providing an exhaustive list of the considerations which
should be reviewed by courts in every disciplinary dismissal case involv-
ing the right to counsel, the above mentioned factors are elements
which should be taken into account by courts in order to avoid the sort
of shallow reasoning displayed in Rustad. If the courts choose to weigh
these factors as suggested, it is likely they will move toward recognition
of a right to counsel not only in cases which are similar to Rustad, but
also in a wide range of student disciplinary dismissal cases in which the
98. To date, courts have not advanced this line of reasoning in student disciplinary
dismissal cases involving the right to counsel.
99. See, e.g., Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1388 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
100. Several decisions have concluded that the use of counsel by the educational insti-
tution in a disciplinary dismissal proceeding is a pivotal factor in determining whether the
student has a right to counsel. E.g., Texarkana Ind. School Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727,
735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); see also Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir.
1967); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1075-76 (1969).
101. See supra note 37.
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costs to the government are minimal and the student's interests are ob-
vious and substantial.
IV. CONCLUSION
It seemed that the schoolhouse door had been opened wide for the
expansion of student due process when Goss was decided almost a dec-
ade ago. Some jurists feared this possibility,' 0 2 while some commenta-
tors held their breath hopefully.' 0 3 Inch by inch, though, the door
opened by Goss is closing. Post Goss rulings by the Supreme Court indi-
cate that procedural due process on campus will only be required when
discipline of the student includes the sanctions of suspension or expul-
sion.1 0 4 And, in this one context where due process must be afforded
the student, lower courts have been divided as to the exact procedural
safeguards which must be provided. Unless future decisions re-examine
factors relevant to the traditional procedural due process balancing of
interests analysis, the Ruslad decision will mark another step towards en-
suring that student due process will be rigidly interpreted in almost
every student disciplinary dismissal proceeding to require nothing less,
and nothing more, than notice and a hearing.
Wendy Bliss
102. Justice Powell, dissenting in Goss, first articulated these doubts: "No one can fore-
see the ultimate frontiers of the new 'thicket' the Court now enters. Today's ruling ap-
pears to sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of discretionary
decisions in the educational process." Goss, 419 U.S. at 597.
103. See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Counsel in Disciplinary Proceedings in Public and Private
Educational Institutions, 9 CuM. L. REv. 751, 765-66 (1979).
104. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (no hearing necessary
for students dismissed for academic purposes); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
(the use of corporal punishment does not require notice and hearing prior to
punishment).
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